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1 Introduction
The current merger policy, both in the U.S. and in the E.U., does not seem to distinguish
between horizontal mergers that take place in vertically related industries from those in
final product industries alone.1 In this paper we argue that, by failing to take into account
a number of crucial features of vertically related industries, policy makers could be lead to
an imprecise account of the effects of horizontal mergers and thus, possibly, to misleading
policy recommendations.
Trading in vertically related industries may take a number of different forms. While in
some industries firms use simple linear wholesale price contracts, in others, more complicated
non-linear contracts, such as two-part tariffs, are employed. Moreover, the specific terms of
the various trading forms - the contract terms - are often the outcome of bargaining between
the industry’s trading parties.2 Both, the contract type employed and the bargaining over
the specific contract terms, can affect significantly the market outcomes and, therefore,
constitute crucial features of vertically related industries.
In this paper we explore the incentives for upstream horizontal mergers in two-tier
industries and evaluate their welfare implications, allowing both for alternative types of
vertical contracts and for bargaining over the contract terms. We consider two vertical
chains, each consisting of one upstream and one downstream firm, involved into a three-
stage game. In stage one, the upstream firms decide whether to merge or not. If they
merge, then in stage two, the upstream monopolist bargains simultaneously with the two
downstream firms over their contract terms. Otherwise, each independent upstream firm
bargains with its respective downstream customer. Finally, the downstream firms compete
in quantities. We allow for two distinct types of vertical contracts, a linear wholesale price
contract and a two-part tariff contract. We show that the type of vertical contract over
which bargaining takes place is crucial not only for the upstream merger incentives but also
for the effects of such mergers.
1Horizontal mergers in intermediate product markets constitute a common practice. See e.g. merger
of car engine suppliers (Kolbenschmidt/Pierburg), merger of health IT suppliers (iSoft/Torex), merger of
medical devices providers (General Electrics/Instrumentarium).
2For example, large food retailers as well as general retailers (e.g. Wal-Mart) bargain over the terms of
trade with their suppliers, just like large tour operators bargain with airlines and hotels, car manufacturers
with car parts providers, and large book retailers (e.g. Barnes & Noble) with publishers.
One key difference between the case in which the upstream firms merge and the case
in which they remain independent is that, a merged upstream firm who disagrees with
one of the downstream firms still has the option of reaching an agreement with the rival
downstream firm, and thus, its disagreement payoff is not zero. One might expect that
this would imply that the upstream bargaining position is enhanced in the case of merger.
And indeed this is so when firms trade using linear wholesale price contracts. Surprisingly
though, when firms trade using two-part tariff contracts, the mere existence of an outside
option weakens the bargaining position of the upstream merged firm. The reason behind
this is a follows. In case of disagreement with one of the downstream firms, the rival
downstream firm will act as a monopolist in the final product market and will thus increase
its output. The downstream production though is subsidized (i.e. wholesale prices are
below marginal cost) under two-part tariffs, but not under wholesale prices. Therefore,
while the disagreement payoff of an independent upstream firm is always equal to zero, that
of a merged upstream firm is effectively negative under two-part tariffs and positive under
wholesale prices.
A second key difference between a merged supplier and an independent one stems from
the fact that an increase in the wholesale price charged to one downstream firm leads to
an increase in the output of the rival downstream firm. Since downstream production is
subsidized only under two-part tariffs, this creates a negative effect to upstream suppliers
under two-part tariffs and a positive effect under wholesale prices. A merged supplier, in
contrast to an independent supplier, internalizes this negative (positive) effect under two-
part tariffs (wholesale prices). The internalization of this effect in the case of merger, coupled
with the above mentioned change in the upstream disagreement payoff, leads to a decrease
in the wholesale prices under two-part tariff contracts and to an increase under wholesale
price contracts. As a result, the incentives for upstream horizontal mergers depend heavily
on the contract type used in vertical trading. Indeed, upstream firms have a disincentive
to merge when they use two-part tariff contracts and an incentive to merge when they use
instead wholesale price contracts.
Regarding the welfare effects of upstream horizontal mergers, we show that such mergers
can be procompetitive even if they do not generate any synergies. In particular, when
bargaining takes place over two-part tariff contracts, an upstream merger is beneficial both
2
for consumers and overall welfare. The impact of the merger on consumers’ surplus is
clearly due to the lower wholesale prices which lead to lower final good prices. Surprisingly,
the downstream firms are better off when the upstream merger takes place. This is so
because when the downstream firms deal with an upstream monopolist, they face better
terms of trade due to the monopolist’s weaker bargaining position. The two positive effects
of a merger, on consumer surplus and downstream profits, dominate its negative effect
on upstream profits, and as a consequence the upstream merger turns out to be welfare
improving when two-part tariff contracts are used. A reversal of all the above results occurs
when wholesale contracts are used since the intuitive arguments work in exactly the opposite
direction.
Our findings have important implications for merger policy. The existing merger reg-
ulation (see e.g. U.S. Merger Guidelines) fails to distinguish in general among horizontal
mergers in upstream and downstream markets. It also fails to distinguish among horizontal
mergers under different vertical trading arrangements. Our findings highlight the role of
vertical trading arrangements on the welfare impact of horizontal mergers. Hence, they
clearly suggest that the antitrust authorities should take the trading arrangements into
account in their treatment of horizontal mergers in intermediate industries.
Extending our main analysis, we show that whether the choice of contract type is in
the upstream firms’ discretion or not plays an important role for the market structure.
The same holds for the timing of bargaining between the upstream monopolist and the
two downstream firms. In particular, we show that when the upstream firms have the
discretion of choosing whether to use wholesale price or two-part tariff contracts, a merger
takes place only if the upstream bargaining power is sufficiently low, in which case the
upstream monopolist uses a wholesale price contract. If the upstream bargaining power
is high, the upstream firms prefer two-part tariff contracts and have thus no incentives to
merge. Considering the case in which a merged supplier bargains sequentially, rather than
simultaneously, with the two downstream firms, we reassert, under certain conditions, our
main result that there are no incentives for a merger under two-part tariffs. We pinpoint
though that in this case the upstream monopolist can credibly commit to foreclose one of
the downstream firms. The possibility of foreclosure makes the merger more attractive when
the final goods are close substitutes and thus when the downstream competition is strong.
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As a consequence, we find that, under sequential bargaining, the two-part tariffs can lead
to a change not only in the upstream but also in the downstream market structure.
The existing literature on horizontal mergers has focused on mergers in final product
markets and has, to a great extent, ignored mergers in vertically related industries. The
seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) is one of the few exceptions. According to Horn
and Wolinsky (1988), when the downstream firms’ products are substitutes, the upstream
firms always have an incentive to merge as the merger allows them to charge higher wholesale
prices. While Horn and Wolinsky restrict attention to linear wholesale price contracts, we
allow for a more general contract space and demonstrate that their result is quite sensitive to
the type of contract used. We thus highlight the point that the vertical contract type cannot
be considered of minor importance. The type of vertical contract can have a strong impact
on the equilibrium predictions and in particular, on the market structure. Moreover, we
add to Horn and Wolinsky by providing a welfare analysis of upstream horizontal mergers
which has important implications for merger policy.
In a model in which firms use only two-part tariff contracts, Ziss (1995) confirms the
above mentioned result of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and shows that an upstream horizontal
merger is welfare detrimental. In contrast to us and to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Ziss
abstracts from the possibility of bargaining by assuming that the upstream firms unilaterally
and irrevocably set the terms of contracts. As we demonstrate, his results are extremely
sensitive to the presence of bargaining.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our model.
In Sections 3 and 4 respectively, we analyze the case of independent upstream firms and
the case of an upstream horizontal merger. In Section 5, we examine the upstream firms’
incentives to merge. In Section 6, we perform a welfare analysis and discuss its policy
implications. In Section 7, we consider a number of extensions of our model. Finally, in
Section 8, we conclude. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3O’Brien and Shaffer (2004) and Inderst and Wey (2003) also examine horizontal mergers in intermediate
product markets, however, they consider settings which are very different from ours (e.g. settings in which
competition in the downstream market is absent). von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Dobson and Waterson
(1997), and Lommerud et al. (2005) examine instead horizontal mergers in downstream markets restricting
attention to wholesale price contracts.
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2 The Model
We consider a two-tier industry consisting of two upstream and two downstream firms,
denoted respectively by Ui and Di, with i = 1, 2. One could easily think of the upstream and
the downstream firms as being respectively input producers and final good manufacturers,
labor unions and firms, wholesalers and retailers. We assume that production for the
upstream firms involves a constant marginal cost c and that there is a one-to-one relation
between the products of Ui and Di (e.g. between input and final product). Furthermore,
we assume that there is an exclusive relation between Ui and Di, i = 1, 2.4
Each downstream firm Di faces the following inverse demand function:
pi = a− qi − γqj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, 0 ≤ c < a, 0 < γ < 1, (1)
where pi and qi are respectively the price and the quantity of Di’s final product, and qj
is the quantity of Dj’s final product. The parameter γ denotes the degree of product
substitutability, namely, the higher is γ, the closer substitutes the two final products are.
Competitive interactions are modelled as a three-stage game with observable actions. In
stage one, the upstream firms decide whether to merge horizontally or not. If the upstream
firms do not merge, then in stage two, each downstream firm Di bargains with its upstream
supplier Ui over their terms of trade. If instead the upstream firms do merge then, in
stage two, the newly formed upstream monopolist bargains simultaneously with the two
downstream firms over their terms of trade.5 In the final stage, stage three, the downstream
firms compete in the final market in quantities.
Negotiations between the upstream and downstream firms may be conducted either
over a linear wholesale price contract specifying only a per-unit of input price wi or over a
4This may be the case, for instance, if prior to reaching an agreement on price, Ui and Di have made
some relation-specific investments that prevent them from breaking up. It is reasonable to assume that these
investments represent long-run decisions, while decisions regarding the bargained input price are easier to
reverse in the short-term (for a further discussion of this assumption see Horn and Wolinsky, 1988, Gal-Or,
1991, and Symeonidis, 2004).
5One could think of two representatives of the upstream monopolist, each of them negotiating at the
same time with a different downstream firm over their own terms of trade. This is a standard assumption in
the literature, see Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Marshall and Merlo (2004), among others. In subsection 7.2
we relax this assumption and examine what happens when the upstream monopolist bargains sequentially,
instead of simultaneously, with the two downstream firms.
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non-linear two-part tariff contract, including both a wholesale price wi and a fixed fee Fi.
Under both types of contracts, we model these negotiations as a generalized Nash bargaining
problem, where the bargaining power of each upstream and downstream firm is respectively
β and 1 − β, 0 < β ≤ 1, and then characterize its equilibrium using the generalized Nash
product solution. The entire game is solved by deriving its subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 Independent Upstream Suppliers
In this section we derive the equilibrium outcome for the case in which the upstream firms
act as independent suppliers.
In the final market competition stage, no matter whether a wholesale price contract
(wi) or a two-part tariff contract (wi, Fi) has been negotiated in the previous stage, each
Di chooses its quantity qi, taking qj as given, in order to maximize its (gross) profits:
max
qi
πDi = (a− qi − γqj)qi − wiqi. (2)
The first order conditions give rise to the following reaction functions:
Ri(qj, wi) =
a−wi − γqj
2
. (3)
Clearly, a decrease in the wholesale price faced by Di shifts its reaction function upwards
and makes the downstream firm more aggressive in the final market. Solving the system of
reaction functions (3), we obtain the equilibrium quantities:
qi(wi, wj) =
a(2− γ)− 2wi + γwj
4− γ2 . (4)
It follows that the (gross) profits of Di and Ui are:
πDi(wi, wj) =
[a(2− γ)− 2wi + γwj]2
(4− γ2)2 ; (5)
πUi(wi, wj) = (wi − c)qi(wi, wj) = (wi − c)
a(2− γ)− 2wi + γwj
4− γ2 . (6)
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3.1 Bargaining over wholesale price contracts
In stage two, Ui and Di bargain over the wholesale price wi, taking into account that the
wholesale price paid by Dj is determined in the simultaneously run negotiations between
Uj and Dj and thus that the two bargaining problems are interdependent. In particular,
letting wSj denote the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining between Uj and Dj (i.e. the
equilibrium wholesale price paid by Dj), wi is chosen to maximize the generalized Nash
bargaining product:
max
wi
£
πUi(wi, wSj )
¤β £πDi(wi, wSj )¤1−β , (7)
where πUi(wi, wSj ) and πDi(wi, wSj ) are given by equations (6) and (5), and β is the bargain-
ing power of the upstream firms. Note that since both the upstream and the downstream
firms do not have any other trading partners, their disagreement payoffs are equal to zero.
Taking the first order condition of (7) we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices:
wS = wSi = wSj = c+
β(2− γ)(a− c)
4− βγ > c. (8)
Note that the equilibrium wholesale prices decrease with the degree of product substitutabil-
ity and remain always above the marginal cost of input c. Finally, substituting (8) into (5)
and (6), we obtain the equilibrium downstream and upstream profits under wholesale price
contracts:
πSDi =
4(2− β)2(a− c)2
(2 + γ)2(4− βγ)2 and π
S
Ui =
2β(2− β)(2− γ)(a− c)2
(2 + γ)(4− βγ)2 . (9)
3.2 Bargaining over two-part tariff contracts
In stage two, Ui and Di bargain both over the wholesale price wi and the fixed fee -
upstream transfer Fi, taking as given the outcome of the simultaneously run two-part tariff
negotiations between Uj and Dj. Letting (bwSj , bFSj ) denote the equilibrium outcome of the
bargaining between Uj and Dj, wi and Fi are chosen in order to maximize the generalized
Nash product:
max
wi,Fi
[πUi(wi, bwSj ) + Fi]β [πDi(wi, bwSj )− Fi]1−β . (10)
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Again, disagreement payoffs for both the upstream and the downstream firms are equal to
zero since none of the firms has an alternative trading partner. Maximizing (10) first with
respect to Fi we get:
Fi = βπDi(wi, bwSj )− (1− β)πUi(wi, bwSj ). (11)
Using (11) we observe that the net profits of Ui and Di can be rewritten as:
πUi(wi, bwSj ) + Fi = β £πUi(wi, bwSj ) + πDi(wi, bwSj )¤ ; (12)
πDi(wi, bwSj )− Fi = (1− β) £πUi(wi, bwSj ) + πDi(wi, bwSj )¤ .
Substituting the above expressions into (10), it follows that the generalized Nash product
reduces to an expression proportional to the joint profits of Ui and Di. Hence, wi is chosen
to maximize these joint profits:
max
wi
[πUi(wi, bwSj ) + πDi(wi, bwSj )] = [a− qi(wi, bwSj )− γqj(wi, bwSj )− c]qi(wi, bwSj ). (13)
From the first order conditions of (13) we find the equilibrium wholesale prices:
bwS = bwSi = bwSj = c− γ2(a− c)4 + 2γ − γ2 < c. (14)
Note that bwSi < c and ∂ bwSi /∂γ < 0. That is, the wholesale prices reflect a subsidy from the
upstream firms to their respective downstream firms and this subsidy is higher, the higher is
the degree of substitutability between the goods. The intuition is as follows. A downstream
firm, via a lower wholesale price, can commit to a more aggressive behavior in the final
product market. Its reaction curve shifts out, and as the reaction curves are downward
slopping, this results in lower quantity for the rival downstream firm, and higher quantity
and gross profits for the own downstream firm.6 The portion of these gross profits that is
transferred upstream, via the fixed fee, not only compensates for the upstream losses but
also leaves a "good deal" of profits to the upstream firm. Clearly, in the limit case where the
6This is in the same vein as in the strategic delegation literature, where firms’ owners unilaterally set
two-part tariffs, in anticipation of their managers’ quantity competition (see e.g. Vickers, 1985, Fershtman
and Judd, 1987, and Sklivas, 1987).
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final products are independent, there is no strategic role for subsidies and the equilibrium
wholesale prices turn out to be equal to the marginal cost of input c. Note also that the
equilibrium level of bwS is independent of the bargaining power distribution. This is so
because, as we saw above, while the wholesale price is chosen to maximize the joint profits
of Ui and Di, the role of the fixed fee is to split these joints profits among the upstream
and the downstream firm according to their respective bargaining powers (see (12)).
Finally, substituting (14), (5) and (6) into (12), we obtain the net equilibrium profits of
the downstream and upstream firms under two-part tariff contracts:
bπSDi = 2(1− β)(2− γ2)(a− c)2(4 + 2γ − γ2)2 and bπSUi = 2β(2− γ2)(a− c)2(4 + 2γ − γ2)2 . (15)
4 Upstream Horizontal Merger
We turn now to the analysis of the case in which the two upstream suppliers are horizontally
integrated, and thus, act as an upstream monopolist, denoted by U .
The last stage of the game is the same as in the case of independent upstream suppliers
and thus the equilibrium quantities are given by (4). The second stage of the game though
is different, since now one firm - the upstream monopolist - bargains simultaneously with
the two downstream firms. This brings about two important modifications relatively to the
case of independent upstream suppliers. First, the (gross) profits of the upstream firm are
no longer given by (6), but instead by:
πU(wi, wj) = (wi − c)qi(wi, wj) + (wj − c)qj(wi, wj). (16)
And second, while the disagreement payoffs of the downstream firms are again equal
to zero, the disagreement payoff of the upstream monopolist is not anymore null since U
has now an ‘outside option’. In particular, if Di does not reach an agreement with U , the
disagreement payoff of U will be equal to U ’s profits when Dj operates as a downstream
monopolist facing a per unit of input cost equal to the equilibrium wholesale price antici-
pated to be established in the bargaining between U and Dj. Clearly, the above differences
imply that the terms of trade in the case of an upstream merger will differ from those in
the case of independent suppliers.
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4.1 Bargaining over wholesale price contracts
The upstream monopolist U bargains with the downstream firm Di over the wholesale price
wi, taking as given the outcome of its simultaneously run negotiations with Dj. Letting wMj
denote the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining between U and Dj, that is, the anticipated
wholesale price to be paid by Dj, wi is chosen to maximize the generalized Nash product:
max
wi
£
πU(wi, wMj )− d(wMj )
¤β £πDi(wi, wMj )¤1−β , (17)
where πU(wi, wMj ) and πDi(wi, wMj ) are given respectively by (16) and (5), and d(wMj ) =
(wMj − c)qmj (wMj ), with qmj (wMj ) = (a−wMj )/2, is the disagreement payoff of the upstream
monopolist, in case that Dj acts as downstream monopolist in the final good market facing
input price wMj . Taking the first order condition of (17) we obtain the equilibrium wholesale
prices and the respective net equilibrium profits:
wM = wMi = wMj = c+
β(a− c)
2
> c; (18)
πMDi =
(2− β)2(a− c)2
4(2 + γ)2 and π
M
U =
β(2− β)(a− c)2
2(2 + γ) . (19)
Note that, in contrast to the case of independent suppliers, the equilibrium wholesale
prices are now independent of the degree of product substitutability. Moreover, the com-
parison of the equilibrium wholesale prices in the case of an upstream merger (18) with that
in the case of independent suppliers (8), leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 When firms bargain over wholesale price contracts, the equilibrium whole-
sale price in the case of an upstream horizontal merger is always higher than in the case of
independent upstream firms, wM > wS.
The result presented in Proposition 1 is not new and can also be found in Horn and
Wolinsky (1988) and in Davidson (1988). The positive effect of an upstream merger on
the equilibrium wholesale prices is due to the following two reasons. The first reason has
to do with the fact that an increase in the wholesale price charged to Di has an effect
not only on Di’s output, but also on the output of Dj. It actually, has a positive effect
on the latter. A merged upstream firm, in contrast to an independent one, internalizes
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this positive effect and sets higher wholesale prices.7 The second reason that wholesale
prices rise has to do with the upstream disagreement payoffs. An upstream monopolist that
does not reach an agreement with Di, recoups some of its losses because Dj will increase
its output in the final good production stage - it has thus a positive disagreement payoff.
An independent upstream firm does not recoup any of its losses in case of disagreement,
since it does not dispose an ‘outside option’. The positive disagreement payoff increases
the upstream monopolist’s effective bargaining position, leading in turn to higher wholesale
prices.
4.2 Bargaining over two-part tariff contracts
The upstream monopolist U bargains now with the downstream firm Di over both the
wholesale price wi and the fixed fee Fi, taking as given the outcome of its simultaneously run
negotiations with Dj. Letting ( bwMj , bFMj ) denote the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining
between U and Dj , that is, the anticipated wholesale price and fixed fee to be paid by Dj,
wi and Fi are chosen to maximize the generalized Nash product:
max
wi,Fi
[πU(wi, bwMj ) + Fi + bFMj − bd( bwMj , bFMj )]β[πDi(wi, bwMj )− Fi]1−β, (20)
where πU(wi, bwMj ) and πDi(wi, bwMj ) are given respectively by (16) and (5), and bd(bwMj , bFMj ) =
( bwMj − c)qmj ( bwMj ) + bFMj , with qmj ( bwMj ) = (a − bwMj )/2, is the disagreement payoff of the
upstream monopolist, in case that Dj acts as downstream monopolist in the final market
facing input price bwMj . Note that in this case the disagreement payoff consists of two parts:
(1) U ’s profits from selling the input to Dj and (2) the fixed-fee that Dj pays to U inde-
pendently of the quantity of the input bought. Maximizing (20) first with respect to Fi we
get:
Fi = βπDi(wi, bwMj )− (1− β) hπU (wi, bwMj ) + bFMj − bd(.)i . (21)
7The ability of the upstrem monopolist to internalize the positive effect is also responsible for the inde-
pendence of wM from the degree of product substitutability.
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Using (21), the expressions within the brackets of (20) can be rewritten as:
πU (wi, bwMj ) + Fi + bFMj − bd(.) = β hπU(wi, bwMj ) + bFMj + πDi(wi, bwMj )− bd(.)i ; (22)
πDi(wi, bwMj )− Fi = (1− β) hπU (wi, bwMj ) + bFMj + πDi(wi, bwMj )− bd(.)i .
Substituting the above expressions into (20), it follows that the generalized Nash product
reduces to an expression proportional to the ‘extra’ joint surplus generated by U and Di,
that is, the sum of the profits of U and Di minus U ’s disagreement payoff from dealing with
Dj alone. Hence, wi is chosen to maximize this extra joint surplus:
max
wi
[πU(wi, bwMj ) + πDi(wi, bwMj ) + bFMj − bd(.)] = (23)
[a− qi(wi, bwMj )− γqj(wi, bwMj )− c]qi(wi, bwMj ) + ( bwMj − c)qj(wi, bwMj )− ( bwMj − c)qmj ( bwMj ).
From the first order conditions of (23) we find the equilibrium wholesale prices and the
respective net equilibrium profits under two-part tariff contracts:
bwM = bwMi = bwMj = c− γ2(a− c)2(2− γ2) < c; (24)
bπMU = (2− γ) £β(4− 2γ − 2γ2 + γ3)− γ3¤ (a− c)24(2− γ2)2 ; (25)
bπMDi = (1− β)(2− γ)2(a− c)28(2− γ2) . (26)
In this case too, the wholesale prices reflect a subsidy from the upstream monopolist to
the downstream firms, bwM < c, and this subsidy decreases as the degree of substitutability of
the final goods becomes smaller, ∂ bwM/∂γ < 0. This is now due to the fact that the upstream
monopolist conducts two-part tariff negotiations simultaneously with the two downstream
firms. While negotiating with Di, U cannot credibly commit to a high bargained wholesale
price wj that will make the rival downstream firm Dj behave as a soft competitor in the final
good market. Clearly then, U and Di will never agree in setting a wholesale price wi ≥ c,
because Di knows that in this case U has an incentive to make Dj an aggressive competitor
in the final product market via a lower wholesale price. The upstream monopolist has such
an incentive because, via a higher fixed fee - upstream transfer, it will not only recoup its
losses from selling input below marginal cost to Dj but it will also obtain higher net overall
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profits.8 Obviously, the lower is the degree of substitutability between the final goods, the
smaller is the impact of the upstream monopolist’s inability to commit on the equilibrium
wholesale prices. In addition, the latter are again independent of the bargaining power
distribution since bwM is chosen to maximize the ‘extra’ joint surplus of U and Di, with
the fixed fee used to split this surplus among them according to their respective bargaining
powers.
Surprisingly, the equilibrium wholesale price in the case of an upstream merger (24)
turns out to be lower than the wholesale price in the case of independent suppliers (14).
This is formally stated in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 When firms bargain over two-part tariff contracts, the equilibrium wholesale
price in the case of an upstream horizontal merger is always lower than in the case of
independent upstream firms, bwM < bwS.
Recall that exactly the opposite result holds under wholesale price contracts. That is,
while the impact of an upstream merger on the equilibrium wholesale prices is positive
under wholesale price contracts, it is negative under two-part tariff contracts. The intuition
behind the latter result hinges on two effects. First, the merged suppliers take into account
that an increase in the wholesale price charged to Di leads to an increase in the output of
Dj. An increase in the output of Dj means in turn an increase in the subsidy from U to Dj,
since as mentioned above U subsidizes the downstream production (i.e. the wholesale price
charged to Dj is below c). Thus, in contrast to the case of wholesale price contracts, an
increase in the wholesale price charged to Di has now a negative, rather than positive, effect
on the upstream firm due to the increase in the output of Dj. Since this negative effect is
internalized only when the firms merge, the upstream incentives to increase the wholesale
prices are weaker in the presence of an upstream merger. Second, the ‘effective’ disagreement
payoff of the merged suppliers is actually negative in the case of two-part tariffs.9 This is so
because in the case of disagreement between U and Di, Dj will increase its output acting
8This is in the spirit of Rey and Tirole (2003) where an upstream monopolist offering two-part tariff
contracts to two downstream firms cannot extract all the surplus in the case that the contracts are secret or
can be privately renegotiated.
9The term ‘effective’ refers to the variable part of U ’s disagreement payoff, i.e. the first term ofbd( bwMj , bFMj ). Its fixed part bFMj does not play any role because it enters in both U ’s profits and disagreement
payoff, and thus, it cancels out.
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as a downstream monopolist, causing higher losses to U who subsidizes its production.
Clearly, the negative effective disagreement payoff weakens the bargaining position of a
merged supplier relative to that of an independent supplier with zero disagreement payoff,
leading to lower wholesale prices under a merger.
5 Merger Incentives
We turn now to the analysis of stage one, that is, we analyze the upstream firms’ incentives
to merge.
The following Proposition contains our main findings.
Proposition 3 (i) When firms bargain over wholesale price contracts, the upstream firms
always have incentives to merge horizontally.
(ii) When firms bargain over two-part tariff contracts, the upstream firms have no in-
centives to merge horizontally.
According to part (i) of Proposition 3, when wholesale price contracts are used, we should
always expect the upstream firms to merge. As noted by Horn and Wolinsky (1988), the
main reason behind this result is that an upstream monopolist, in contrast to an upstream
competitor, internalizes the positive effect mentioned in the discussion of Proposition 1.
The internalization of this effect, together with the improvement in the upstream bargaining
position due to the monopolist’s positive disagreement payoff, leads to an increase in the
total upstream profits, creating a clear incentive for an upstream horizontal merger.
Interestingly, the opposite result holds when two-part tariff contracts are used. In this
case the upstream firms prefer to remain separated. This result is surprising since it con-
trasts with the conventional wisdom according to which firms prefer to be monopolists. The
intuition behind it comes from the negative effect of the upstream merger on the equilibrium
wholesale prices (Proposition 2). An upstream firm using two-part tariffs always subsidizes
downstream production. An upstream monopolist, in contrast to an upstream competitor,
internalizes the negative effect of a wholesale price increase in total downstream subsidies.
This internalization, coupled with the deterioration in the upstream bargaining position
due to the monopolist’s negative effective disagreement payoff, lead to a fall in the total
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upstream profits in the case of a merger compared to total profits in the case of indepen-
dent suppliers. Our finding suggests that in the case in which two-part tariff contracts are
used, the upstream firms will not pursue a horizontal merger, unless the negative effects
mentioned above are offset by sufficient merger-related efficiency gains.
Proposition 3 clearly indicates that the predictions of our model regarding the equi-
librium market structure under two-part tariff contracts differ sharply from those under
wholesale price contracts. It is clear then, that the type of contract over which bargaining
takes place between upstream and downstream firms cannot be considered of minor impor-
tance. Indeed, the vertical contract type may have significant implications not only for the
distribution of gains between the upstream and the downstream firms, but, more impor-
tantly, for the equilibrium industry structure. In particular, our analysis predicts that in
an industry where vertical trading is conducted through linear contracts, we should expect
to observe, in equilibrium, an upstream merger taking place even in the absence of any
efficiency gains. In an industry though where vertical trading is conducted through non-
linear contracts and an upstream merger does not bring about important efficiency gains,
we should expect to observe, in equilibrium, the upstream suppliers remaining independent
and dealing separately with their downstream partners.
6 Welfare Analysis
We next examine the effects of an upstream horizontal merger on downstream profits, con-
sumers’ surplus and total welfare, as well as we discuss the policy implications of our find-
ings. Defining total welfare as the sum of consumers’ surplus and upstream and downstream
firms’ profits, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 4 An upstream horizontal merger has a positive (negative) effect on down-
stream firms’ profits, on consumers’ surplus and on total welfare when firms bargain over
two-part tariff (wholesale price) contracts.
Proposition 4 implies that an upstream merger can be procompetitive even if it does
not lead to any efficiency gains for the merged firms. In particular, when bargaining takes
place over two-part tariff contracts, an upstream merger is beneficial both for consumers
and total welfare. The intuition behind the effect of an upstream merger on the consumers’
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surplus is straightforward. As stated in Proposition 2, under two-part tariff contracts, the
equilibrium wholesale prices are lower when upstream suppliers are merged than when they
act independently. Lower input prices lead to lower final product prices and thus to higher
consumers’ surplus. The effect of the upstream merger on total welfare is more involved
as one has to consider also how downstream and upstream firms’ profits are affected. In
contrast to conventional wisdom, Proposition 4 asserts that downstream firms are better off
with a monopolized upstream market. The intuition behind this stems from our discussion
of Proposition 3(ii). Downstream firms enjoy more favorable terms of trade when dealing
with an upstream monopolist. Not only they face a lower input price, but also a lower
fixed fee. The latter is due to the fact that the upstream bargaining position is weaker
when upstream firms merge than when they act as independent suppliers. In contrast to
downstream profits, we have seen in Proposition 3(ii) that upstream profits decrease due to
the merger. The two positive effects of the merger, on consumer surplus and downstream
profits, dominate its negative effect on upstream profits, and as a result the upstreammerger
turns out to be welfare improving when two-part tariff contracts are used.
A reversal of all the above results is observed when wholesale contracts are used. Fol-
lowing Propositions 1 and 3(i), it is easy to see that the intuitive arguments work in exactly
the opposite direction in this case.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4 one can conclude that the upstream firms choose to
merge only when their merger is welfare detrimental. For instance, while under wholesale
price contracts, the upstream firms have incentives to merge, welfare is higher if they remain
separated. The opposite holds under two-part tariff contracts. Even if a merger would then
be welfare improving the firms do not choose to merge in the absence of important merger-
related cost savings.
The above findings clearly have important policy implications. The existing merger reg-
ulation (see e.g. U.S. Merger Guidelines) does not distinguish in general among horizontal
mergers in upstream and downstream markets. Moreover, it does not distinguish among
horizontal mergers under different vertical trading arrangements. Our findings point out
the role of vertical contracts on the welfare impact of horizontal mergers. Hence, they sug-
gest that the treatment of upstream horizontal mergers by the antitrust authorities should
depend, among other things, on vertical trading arrangements. In particular, if a merger
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between upstream firms takes place in an industry in which vertical trading is conducted
through non-linear contracts, then this merger should not raise serious antitrust concerns.
Surprisingly, although such a merger leads to an increase in monopoly power, it also leads
to a decrease in the prices and an increase in downstream profits even in the absence of
efficiency gains. Not only this but also the appearance of such a merger could indicate
the existence of merger-related efficiency gains since, as we mentioned above, firms would
not have incentives to merge otherwise. Things should be different in the case in which
an upstream merger takes place in an industry in which firms trade using linear wholesale
price contracts. The antitrust authorities should allow such a merger to go through only if
it brings about important efficiency gains. If not, then as we have seen above, the merger
will be detrimental to welfare.
7 Extensions
In this section we consider two modifications of the basic model in order to discuss the
robustness of our main results.
7.1 Endogenous Contract Type
So far we have assumed that when the upstream firms decide whether to merge or not, they
take the contract type as given. In this subsection we relax this assumption and consider
instead the case in which the choice of contract type is in the discretion of the upstream
firm(s). In particular, we extend our model by adding a stage in which the upstream firm(s)
choose whether they will use wholesale price or two-part tariff contracts, before negotiating
over the terms of trade, but after deciding whether they will merge or not.
Starting with the case of independent upstream firms, we have the following result.
Lemma 1 An independent upstream firm Ui, i = 1, 2, always chooses a two-part tariff
contract.
It is known from the literature (see e.g. Rey and Stiglitz, 1995, Milliou et al., 2004)
that upstream firms prefer two-part tariff to wholesale price contracts whenever they are
independent and have exclusive relations with the downstream firms. The rationale behind
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this result hinges on two arguments. First, while two-part tariff contracts are conditionally
efficient - i.e. they maximize the vertical chain’s joint profits given the rival chain’s strategy -
wholesale price contracts are not. Second, while under two-part tariff contracts, the vertical
chain’s joint profits are shared according to the firms’ bargaining powers, under wholesale
price contracts the downstream firms enjoy a larger share than the one corresponding to
their bargaining power.10 Not surprisingly, an independent upstream firm therefore prefers
a two-part tariff contract to a wholesale price one, since with the former it enjoys a greater
share of a larger pie.
As Lemma 2 below states, the same does not always hold in the case of a merged
upstream firm.
Lemma 2 Whenever the final products are sufficiently close substitutes (i.e. γ > 0.806),
an upstream monopolist U always chooses a wholesale price contract. For lower degrees of
product substitutability, there exists a eβ(γ), such that an upstream monopolist U chooses
a wholesale price contract if β < eβ(γ) and a two-part tariff contract otherwise. Moreover,eβ(.) is increasing in γ and eβ(0) = 0.
According to Lemma 2, the type of contract used in the case of an upstream horizontal
merger depends crucially on the distribution of bargaining power and on the degree of
product substitutability (i.e. the intensity of downstream competition). In particular, the
upstream merged firm prefers to use two-part tariff contracts only if its bargaining power
is sufficiently high and the final products are not very close substitutes. In all other cases,
it prefers to use wholesale price contracts.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 comes from the observation that two-part tariff contracts
have at the same time two disadvantages and two advantages relative to wholesale price
contracts. Starting with their disadvantages, recall that while the upstream monopolist’s
‘effective’ outside option is positive under wholesale prices, it is negative under two-part
tariffs. Recall also that bwM < c < wM , that is, downstream competition under two-part
tariffs is fiercer than under wholesale price contracts and thus the total surplus to be shared
among the upstream monopolist and the downstream firms is smaller under two-part tariffs.
Turning to the advantages of two-part tariffs, first we have seen that while for any given
10A more detailed explanation can be found in Milliou et al. (2004).
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outcome of the negotiations between U and Dj , a two-part tariff maximizes the extra joint
surplus (i.e. that above U ’s outside option) of U and Di, a wholesale price does not.11
Second, we have that while under a two-part tariff U receives the share of the extra joint
surplus that corresponds to its bargaining power (see (22)), under a wholesale price it
receives a relatively lower portion of the surplus.12 Clearly, while an increase in upstream
bargaining power (higher β) reinforces this second advantage of two-part tariffs, a stronger
downstream competition (higher γ) reinforces one of their disadvantages, and thus increases
the attractiveness of wholesale price contracts.
We turn next to stage one, that is, we examine whether or not the upstream firms have
incentives to integrate horizontally, in the case in which the selection of the contract type
is in their own discretion. The following Proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 5 When the final products are sufficiently close substitutes (i.e. γ > 0.975),
the upstream firms always have incentives to merge horizontally. For lower degrees of prod-
uct substitutability, there exists a bβ(γ), such that the upstream firms have incentives to
merge horizontally if and only if β < bβ(γ). Moreover, bβ(γ) < eβ(γ), bβ(.) is increasing in γ
and bβ(0) = 0.
Proposition 5 reveals that whether the contract type is chosen by the trading parties or
not, plays an important role for the market structure. It thus suggests that the assumption
that the contract type is exogenously given cannot be innocuous. In fact, the incentives
for an upstream merger can change significantly when the contract type is assumed to be
chosen by the upstream firms.
In particular, when the final products are not very close substitutes, upstream firms
who have the discretion to choose the form of trading, will not merge unless their bargain-
ing power is low (β < bβ(γ)). This is so, because when the upstream bargaining power is
high (i.e. β > eβ(γ)), we know from Lemmata 1 and 2 that both an independent and a
merged upstream firm choose a two-part tariff contract. Then according to Proposition 4,
11Under a two-part tariff, wi is chosen to maximize the extra joint surplus of U and Di (see (23)), while
under a wholesale price contract, wi is chosen to maximize their generalized Nash product (see (17)).
12To see this last point one has first to rewrite the focs of (17) as: πU−dπDi
= β1−β
∂πU/∂wi
(−∂πDi/∂wi)
. Then, by the
envelop theorem, −∂πDi/∂wi = q∗i , while ∂πU/∂wi = q∗i + (wi − c)∂q∗i /∂wi < q∗i , because wi > c. Hence,
πU−d
πDi
< β
1−β .
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the upstream firms have a disincentive to merge. On the other hand, when β < eβ(γ), an
independent upstream firm chooses a two-part tariff contract, while a merged one a whole-
sale price contract. In this case, the upstream firms will merge unless they possess sufficient
bargaining power (i.e. unless bβ(γ) < β < eβ(γ)). The main force behind this is that, when
the upstream bargaining power is not too low, the inefficiency from double marginalization
(under wholesale prices) is stronger than the inefficiency from below marginal cost input
pricing (under two-part tariffs) and thus the overall pie to be shared between upstream and
downstream firms is larger in the latter case. The opposite is true for relatively low values
of β in which case the upstream firms will merge and use wholesale price contracts. Finally
and for similar reasons, when the products are almost perfect substitutes (γ > 0.975), there
are incentives for merger independently of how powerful upstream firms are.
7.2 Sequential Bargaining and Market Foreclosure
In this subsection we depart from the assumption that an upstream integrated firm bar-
gains simultaneously with all the downstream firms. We assume instead that it bargains
sequentially with them. We show that the pattern of bargaining can play an important
role for the upstream merger incentives. In particular, while under some circumstances, we
reassert our main result that there are no incentives for an upstream merger under two-part
tariff contracts, under others, we find that the firms prefer to merge.
The twisting point of the analysis here is that under sequential bargaining, an upstream
monopolist can credibly commit to foreclose one of the downstream firms. To see this,
let the upstream monopolist U bargain first with D1 and then with D2. The upstream
monopolist has the option to bring the negotiations with D1 to a “dead end” if it wishes to
do so. In case it does so, that is, in case of disagreement with D1, the upstream monopolist
bargains over a two-part tariff with D2. It is easy to see that in this case bargaining will
lead to the maximization of their joint profits, which will then be divided according to
their respective bargaining powers. In particular, wf2 = c, π
f
D2 = (1 − β)(a − c)
2/4 and
πfU = β(a − c)2/4. Therefore, under sequential bargaining, the upstream monopolist can
foreclose D1 and attain profits equal to πfU .13 It will certainly choose to do so whenever
13Under simultaneous bargaining, U cannot credibly commit to bring the negotiations with, say D1, into
a “dead end”, although it has a clear incentive to do so. In fact, D2 knows that, once it agrees to a wholesale
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the overall profits that the upstream monopolist expects from the sequence of successful
negotiations with the two downstream firms are lower than πfU .
The following Proposition summarizes the main results for the sequential bargaining
case.
Proposition 6 Under sequential bargaining over two-part tariff contracts, when the prod-
ucts are not close substitutes (i.e. γ < 0.702), there exists βs(γ) such that for all β ≥ βs(γ),
the upstream firms do not merge horizontally. Otherwise, the upstream firms merge horizon-
tally and the upstream monopolist sells to both downstream firms for all γ if β < βs(γ), while
it forecloses one of the downstream firms for the rest of the parameter values. Moreover,
βs(.) is decreasing in γ, with βs(0) = 1 and βs(1) = 0.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 6 by dividing the (β, γ) parameter space in the three
respective regions. Proposition 6 tells us that if the goods are not close substitutes and
the upstream bargaining power is relatively high, the upstream firms prefer to act as inde-
pendent suppliers under two part tariff contracts. It also tells us that when the goods are
close substitutes, relatively powerful upstream firms have incentives to merge and via the
sequential bargaining pattern, foreclose one of the downstream firms.
Intuitively, when the final goods are close enough substitutes, the upstream suppliers
wish to merge because the merger allows them to eliminate the fierce downstream competi-
tion through the foreclosure of one of the downstream firms. When instead the final goods
are not too close substitutes, the upstream firms may still wish to merge when their bar-
gaining power is not high enough. This is so because a merged upstream firm has a stronger
bargaining position than an independent one due to its outside option while bargaining with
each one of the downstream firms. On the other hand, when relatively powerful upstream
firms do not face strong downstream competition (γ < 0.702), they prefer to act as inde-
pendent suppliers. This is due to the fact that when the upstream monopolist conducts
successful sequential negotiations with the downstream firms, equilibrium wholesale prices
are above marginal cost of input. This results into double marginalization which reduces
the size of the pie to be shared among the upstream monopolist and the downstream firms.
price wf2 = c (and makes its corresponding transfer upstream F
f
2 ), U has an incentive to settle to a lower
wholesale price with D1 and increase thus its overall profits.
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This latter negative effect is stronger than the negative effect due to below marginal cost
of input pricing in case that independent suppliers use two-part tariffs and downstream
competition is not too strong.
It is worth stressing that, under sequential bargaining, two-part tariff contracts can
alter not only the upstream but also the downstream market structure. In particular, if
γ ≥ 0.702 and β > βs(γ), then the downstream market transforms also into a monopoly
since the upstream monopolist forecloses one of the downstream firms.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the incentives for horizontal upstream mergers in intermediate product
markets, along with the welfare implications of such mergers, in the presence of bargaining
between the vertically related firms. We have considered both the case of bargaining over
linear wholesale price contracts and the case of bargaining over non-linear two-part tariff
contracts.
Our key finding is that the type of vertical contract used can play a crucial role both for
the merger incentives and for the welfare effects of mergers. In particular, in the absence
of any efficiency gains, we show that upstream firms have a disincentive to merge when
they trade using two-part tariff contracts and an incentive to merge when they trade using
wholesale price contracts. This finding allows us to highlight the point that the vertical
contract type cannot be considered of minor importance. Indeed, the type of vertical
contract may have significant implications for the equilibrium industry structure.
The same holds for the repercussions of the type of vertical contract on the desirability
of upstream horizontal mergers from a social viewpoint. We find that such mergers are
welfare enhancing under two-part tariffs and welfare detrimental under wholesale prices.
This clearly suggests that the treatment of horizontal mergers by the antitrust authorities
should depend, among other things, on the vertical trading arrangements used.
A maintained assumption of our analysis is that the dealing between the vertically
related firms is exclusive. An obvious direction to extend our analysis is thus a framework
in which the upstream firms could sell to all the downstream firms. A further complication
that would arise in this case is the existence of simultaneous multilateral negotiations over
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wholesale price or two-part tariff contracts among all the upstream and all the downstream
firms. As this is not an easy task, the analysis of this case awaits further work.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) The result follows immediately from (19) and (9), by taking the
difference between the upstream profits in the case of a merger πMU and the sum of each
upstream independent firm’s profits πSU1 + π
S
U2 .
(ii) The result follows immediately from (25) and (15), by taking the difference between
the upstream profits in the case of a merger bπMU and the sum of each upstream independent
firm’s profits bπSU1 + bπSU2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Under wholesale price contracts, we obtain the result regarding
the downstream profits from (19) and (9), by taking the difference of the sum of each
downstream firm’s profits in the case of a merger πMD = πMD1 + π
M
D2 and the respective sum
in the case of independent upstream firms πSD = πSD1 + π
S
D2 . Regarding the consumers’
surplus result, we first calculate the consumers’ surplus both in the case of a merger and in
the case of independent suppliers:
CSk = 1
2
[q1(wk)2 + q2(wk)2 + 2γq1(wk)q2(wk)], k =M,S
Then we take their difference and our result follows. Regarding the total welfare result, we
first calculate total welfare for both cases:
WM = CSM + πMD + πMU and WS = CSS + πSD + πSU1 + π
S
U2.
And then taking their difference we see that WM < WS.
Under two-part tariffs, from (26) and (15), we obtain our results following the same
steps as under wholesale price contracts above. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: We already know from (9) and (15), the profits of an independent
upstream firm in the case that both vertical chains use wholesale price contracts and in the
case that they use two-part tariff contracts. It remains to determine the upstream profits
for the case in which one of the vertical chains uses a two-part tariff contract while the other
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uses a wholesale price contract, and then check whether an upstream firm has incentives to
deviate by switching to the other type of contract.
W.l.o.g. let U1 use a wholesale price contract and U2 a two-part tariff contract. U1 and
D1, taking as given the outcome (wA2 , FA2 ) of the simultaneously run negotiations between
U2 and D2, choose w1 to maximize their Nash product, as in (7). At the same time, U2
and D2, taking as given the outcome wA1 of the simultaneously run negotiations between U1
and D1, choose w2 to maximize their joint profits, as in (13), which are then split according
to their respective bargaining powers, via the suitably chosen fixed fee F2. Taking the first
order conditions and solving we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices and upstream profits
in the asymmetric contract type case A:
wA1 = c+
β(16− 8γ − 8γ2 + 2γ3 + γ4)(a− c)
32− 16γ2 + βγ4 ; (27)
wA2 = c−
(2− γ)γ2(4 + βγ)(a− c)
32− 16γ2 + βγ4 ; (28)
πAU1 =
2β(2− β)(4− 2γ − γ2)(16− 8γ − 8γ2 + 2γ3 + γ4)(a− c)2
(32− 16γ2 + βγ4)2 ; (29)
bπAU2 = 2β(2− γ)2(2− γ2)(4 + βγ)2(a− c)2(32− 16γ2 + βγ4)2 . (30)
Now from (29) and (15) one can check that πAU1 < bπSU1 ; hence, when U2 uses a two-part
tariff contract, U1 has no incentive to switch from a two-part tariff to a wholesale price
contract. Moreover, from (30) and (9) one can check that bπAU2 > πSU2; hence, when U1 uses
a wholesale price contract, U2 has always incentive to switch from a wholesale price to a
two-part tariff contract. Evoking symmetry, the above arguments prove that a two-part
tariff contract strictly dominates a wholesale price contract from the point of view of an
upstream firm. Thus, an independent upstream firm will always choose a two-part tariff
contract. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: This is an immediate consequence of the comparison of a merged
upstream firm’s profits in the case that it uses a wholesale price contract (19) and in the
case it uses a two-part tariff contract (25). It turns out that πMU > bπMU if and only if
β < bβ(γ) = γ(4−γ2)
2(2−γ2) . Since bβ(0) = 0, dbβ/dγ > 0 and bβ(γ) = 1 for γ = 0.806, the result
follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: From Proposition 3(ii) we know that, under two-part tariffs, a
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merged upstream firm obtains lower profits than the sum of the profits of the independent
suppliers. Hence, for all parameter values for which a merged upstream firm prefers a two-
part tariff contract (i.e. for all β > bβ(γ)), the upstream firms are better off by staying
independent.
For the rest of the parameter values, in which the merged upstream firm prefers a
wholesale-price contract, one can check from (19) and (15) that πMU > bπSU1 + bπSU2 if and
only if β < eβ(γ) = 2γ(8+4γ+γ3)
(4+2γ−γ2)2 . Since eβ(0) = 0, deβ/dγ > 0, eβ(γ) = 1 for γ = 0.975, andeβ(γ) < bβ(γ) for all γ, the result follows because by Lemma 1 the independent upstream
firms always use two-part tariff contracts. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Let U bargain with D1 in stage one and with D2 in stage two. The
final market competition stage, stage three, is the same as in Section 3.
In stage two, U and D2 bargain over (w2, F2), given the outcome of the previous stage
negotiations between U and D1. Assume for the moment that U and D1 have reached an
agreement (w1, F1). Then U ’s disagreement payoff is equal to d(w1, F1) = (w1− c)qm1 (w1)+
F1, where qm1 (w1) = (a−w1)/2 is D1’s output when D1 is a monopolist in the final market.
The disagreement payoff of D2 is zero. Now, maximization of the generalized Nash product
first w.r.t. F2 leads to a reduced problem where U and D2 choose w2 to maximize their
extra joint surplus:
max
w2
[πU (w1, w2) + πD2(w1, w2) + F1 − d(.)] = (31)
[a− q2(w1, w2)− γq1(w1, w2)− c]q2(w1, w2) + (w1 − c)q1(w1, w2)− (w1 − c)qm1 (w1).
From the first order conditions of (31), we obtain the wholesale price reaction function of
(U , D2):
w2(w1) =
c(2 + γ)(2− γ2)2 − γ[a(2− γ)γ − 2(2− γ2)w1]
4(2− γ2) . (32)
Note that ∂w2/∂w1 > 0, i.e. an increase in the wholesale price paid by D1 makes now less
profitable for (U , D2) to reduce the wholesale price paid by D2.
In stage one, U and D1 bargain over (w1, F1) taking into account how (U , D2) will
react in the next stage. The disagreement payoff for D1 is zero. In order to determine the
disagreement payoff of U , we have to understand the continuation of the game in case of
disagreement. In the latter market foreclosure case, U and D2 will bargain over a two-part
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tariff (wf2 , F
f
2 ) in the next stage. It is easy to see that, since disagreement payoffs for both
parties will be zero, U and D2 will agree on wf2 = c in order to maximize their joint profits
and that, the agreed fixed-fee F f2 will be such that the maximal joint profits will be shared
among U and D2 according to their respective bargaining powers; therefore, d = β(a−c)2/4.
Taking this into account, the maximization of the generalized Nash product first w.r.t. F1
leads to the reduced problem where U and D1 choose w1 to maximize their extra joint
surplus:
max
w1
[πU(w1, w2(w1) + πD1(w1, w2(w1))− d] = −d+ (w2(w1)− c)q2(w1, w2(w1))
+[a− q1(w1, w2(w1))− γq2(w1, w2(w1)− c]q1(w1, w2(w1)). (33)
where w2(w1) is given by (32). Taking the first order conditions of (33) and using (32), we
obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices
wM1 = c+
(a− c)γ(2− γ)
2(2− γ2) ; w
M
2 = c (34)
Note that wM1 > wM2 = c. In contrast to the case of merged suppliers under simultaneous
bargaining, the upstream monopolist does not subsidize downstream firms in the sequential
bargaining case.
However, (34) is the solution to (33) only if the extra joint surplus - to be shared among
U and D1 according to their respective bargaining powers - is positive. It can be checked
that the extra joint surplus is positive only if β ≤ βs(γ) = 2(1− γ)/(2− γ2). Moreover, for
this range of parameters, the net equilibrium profits of the downstream and upstream firms
turn out to be:
πMD1 =
(1− β)[2− 2γ − β(2− γ2)](a− c)2
4(2− γ2) ; π
M
D2 =
(1− β)(2− γ)2(a− c)2
8(2− γ2) ; (35)
πMU =
[(2− γ)2γ2 − 2β2(2− γ2)2 + β(24− 16γ − 14γ2 + 8γ3 + γ4)](a− c)2
8(2− γ2)2 . (36)
Note that πMD1 < π
M
D2 , i.e. there is a last mover advantage for the downstream firms under
two-part tariff contracts whenever the suppliers are merged.
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If instead β > βs(γ), U has an incentive to bring its negotiations with D1 to a dead
end. Then under market foreclosure, the solution to the problem is, wf2 = c, π
f
D1 = 0,
πfD2 = (1− β)(a− c)
2/4, and πfU = β(a− c)2/4.
To complete the proof, we have to compare the aggregate profits of the independent
suppliers with those of the upstream monopolist. If β ≤ βs(γ), one can check from (15) and
(36) that πSU1+π
S
U2 < π
M
U ; hence, an upstream merger will occur in this range of parameters.
If β > βs(γ), then πSU1 + π
S
U2 < π
f
U only if γ > 0.702; otherwise, the inequality is reversed.
Hence, an upstream merger with market foreclosure will occur if γ > .702 and β > βs(γ);
otherwise, the upstream firms will remain independent. ¥
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